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 Literature on public and private firms has traditionally focused on the efficiency effects 
of differing firm ownership, although the literature has been largely dormant since the 1980s. 
State-led development models in Asia and Latin America warrant continued analysis of this 
fundamental issue in International Political Economy. This paper attempts to frame debate on 
natural resource governance by identifying the factors that affect the mix of public and private 
firms in extractive industry. Historical institutionalism is used as a framework for analyzing 
policy change, and political economy theory of governance institutions is compared to the 
traditional economic theory of the firm. Analyzing the lithium industry in Chile and Bolivia as a 
case study, this paper suggests that temporal factors like historical stability of economic 
modeling and the sustained protection of property rights are critical in determining the optimum 
mix of public and private firms. This paper synthesizes existing scholarly contributions with 






































The South American mineral wealth that financed the western world’s industrialization in 
the 17th and 18th centuries left in its place misery and underdevelopment. Entire mountains in 
the Andes are on the verge of collapsing, having been hollowed out by centuries of incessant 
mining. From gold to guano, South America has seen its economic fortunes tied to the booms 
and busts of natural resource exportation. More recently, the ownership of extractive industries 
like mining and forestry has alternated between public and private with the changing ideological 
tides of economic thought. Developmentalist states gave way to waves of neoliberal privatization 
and now it seems poised to switch once more. The end of the Cold War helped the discourse 
shed some ideological baggage and pragmatic policymakers across the world are attempting to 
create their own models. Part of the reason for these shifts is that natural resource wealth has 
repeatedly proven to impede the development of economic and political institutions more than it 
helps them over recent history, embodied in resource curse discourse.  A part of this reaction has 
been a backlash against multinational corporations (MNCs), which account for the vast majority 
of extractive economic activity worldwide, for their globalized structures and ability to influence 
domestic politics.  Resource sovereignty has reasserted itself in Latin America especially, 
evidenced by popular leftist governments in Bolivia and Venezuela, among others. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are regaining stature in comparison to MNCs on ideological and practical 
grounds.  
Proper resource governance could minimize the effects of the resource curse and spur 
development in areas of the world that have suffered the exploitation of colonialism and 
imperialism for centuries. This paper seeks to understand what factors influence the optimal mix 
of public and private firms in natural resource industries because of the vast development 
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potential of resource wealth. I argue that the popular mainstream debate over the inherent 
efficiencies of state versus privately owned firms is overly reductionist and misses the contextual 
factors that actually matter: a state’s historical commitment to maintaining juridical security, 
popular perceptions of MNCs, and the nature of government’s political base.  This paper will 
examine the lithium industries of Chile and Bolivia as case studies to show what factors 
influenced the creation of two divergent models of ownership.  
Property Rights Theory and Issues of Ownership 
Economic theory provides a useful framework for examining public versus private firms. 
Some approaches focus on ownership incentives and organization within firms; others focus on 
aspects of market structure. Much of the defining literature on the subject was written during the 
mid-1980s, reflecting the powerful tide of privatization/deregulation that also characterized 
political debate at the time. The purely economic perspectives usually attempt to use econometric 
modeling to compare public and private firms numerically and generally use efficiency as the 
main, if not sole, measure of success. Indeed, theories of the firm are applied to a huge range of 
pure economic issues. Although the narrow focus afforded by econometrics is less useful in more 
inherently holistic political economy analysis, this literature inevitably serves to structure this 
paper’s central question.   
It is worth noting here that literature comparing public and private firms is very closely 
tied with literature on privatization. This paper is focused on state-owned enterprise (SOE) and 
private enterprise (PE) and does not attempt to understand privatized firms, which are presented 
with unique ownership issues. Although some of the firms examined in the case studies had at 
one time partial government ownership, they have been private for nearly 30 years now and for 
almost the entire time they have been producing lithium, so they will be treated as if they have 
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always been PEs. Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore many of the general theoretical considerations 
of privatization literature that can be applied to firms that have always been private.  
 One perspective that focuses on firm ownership as key is the property rights theory of 
the firm, which states that SOEs are inherently less efficient because of the attenuation of 
property rights. Jensen and Meckling generalize this conclusion by stating that the behavior of all 
individuals, including firm managers, depends fundamentally on the contracts that determine 
one’s property rights.1 Because they are essentially immune to threats of takeover due to their 
ownership, SOEs have fewer incentives to optimize management structures and inefficiency 
results.2 The presence of a “takeover market” necessitates efficiency in management in order to 
stay independent and in operation. SOEs are protected from takeover by their owner and 
therefore can tolerate higher levels of inefficiency. According to Vining and Boardman, by the 
1990s this school of thought had lost some theoretical traction since its inception in the 1960s, 
though it remains supported empirically. Vining and Boardman compared the 500 largest non-
U.S. industrial firms at the time and concluded that “large industrial MEs and SOEs perform 
substantially worse than similar PCs.”3  
 Property rights theory has developed alongside theories of agency relationships, which 
attempt to explain how contractual relationships between actors in firm management incur 
agency costs. The concept of agency costs is a crucial element for literature on the separation of 
ownership and control, which also applies to the public versus private debate. Fama and Jensen 
conclude that management structures that separate risk bearers from decision makers lead to 
problems of agency, although these are outweighed by benefits from specialization. With 
                                                          
1
 Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure." (1976): 4. 
2
 Alchian, Armen. “Some Economics of Property Rights.” Il Politico 30 (1965): 816–829. 
3
 Boardman, A. E. and A. R. Vining. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of 
the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises." (1989): 4 
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separation of ownership and control firms are able to choose managers that are best suited for 
firm operation.4 Alchain had a similarly important contribution to this area of corporate 
governance, arguing that SOEs run into monitoring problems as well because their degree of 
ownership concentration is higher than any PE could be (all citizens could be considered owners 
in a SOE).5 
 One significant challenge in any ownership-focused argument is to understand the 
behavior of policymakers in SOEs. Understanding the objectives of public firms is one step 
towards this goal. Whereas PEs are intrinsically profit-maximizers, SOEs also seek to maximize 
sociopolitical goals like employment, regional diversification, and securing strategic reserves.6 
Acceleration of technology transfer, reduced inequality, and facilitation of industrialization 
through central planning are other social goals of SOEs set forth by Choksi.7 These goals are not 
always clear, however, which presents another issue specifically for SOEs: the wide array of 
possible state objectives are often not clearly stated and the possibility for electoral change 
creates commitment problems. In their broad summary of privatization literature, Megginson and 
Netter state that the inherent inability of governments to commit to stable policy reduces 
operative efficiency. Furthermore, goals based on general socioeconomic welfare principles are 
difficult to turn into effective policy and are often hard to measure.8  Although focusing on these 
secondary goals generally leads to inefficiencies in a competitive market, market failures can be 
corrected through state intervention via SOEs.  
 
                                                          
4
 Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen. "Separation of Ownership and Control." (1983): 27. 
5
 Shirley, M. and P. Walsh. "Public Vs Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate." (2001). 31 
6
 Fulton, Murray and Larry Karp. "Estimating the Objectives of a Public Firm in a Natural Resource Industry." 
(1989) 270. 
7
 Choksi, Armeane M. State Intervention in the Industrialization of Developing Countries.  1979. 
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Market Structure and Competition 
Theories of market structure and competition are the contemporary response to the 
ownership theories that dominated the last decades of the 20th century.  In their seminal 2001 
literature review, Shirley and Walsh outline this way of thinking in comparison to ownership 
theory. Theories based on competition focus on incentive effects, which are increased in 
competitive markets via threat of decreased market share, and information effects, which help 
owners receive information regarding their costs and managerial performance.9 Yarrow, King, 
Mairesse, and Melitz stress that it is not the ownership, but “the competitive and regulatory 
environment that shapes the incentives of managers.”10 Kole and Mulherin’s 1997 analysis of 
public and private firm performance after the Second World War came to a similar conclusion. 
Megginson and Netter qualifies this assessment to cases where the state does not play an active 
role in the firm’s operation, which is clearly a fairly large change.11 
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that while the presence of competition can mitigate 
the inefficiencies of public ownership, it generally does not outweigh them entirely. Shirley and 
Walsh even outline how SOEs could be incentivized to anti-competitive behavior. The blame is 
placed on politicians, who are supposedly unable to commit to fomenting competition. In fact, 
situations of high competition that would be best for SOEs are actively avoided by politicians.12  
Another important vein of market structure theory focuses on oligopolistic markets and  
natural monopolies, where a public firm could help solve some market failure. Because of ever-
increasing returns to scale, natural monopolies are most efficient with one firm. This has been 
the justification for state involvement in many developed countries, predominantly in the 
                                                          
9
 Shirley, M. and P. Walsh. 7 
10
 Yarrow, G, M. King, J. Mairesse, and J. Melitz. "Privatization in Theory and Practice. (1986): 323-377. 
11
 Megginson and Netter 14 
12
 Shirley and Walsh (2001) 9  
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telecommunications industry. In developing nations, the justification for state involvement is 
related more to general market failures. Shirley and Walsh believe the literature is flawed in 
these instances by comparing state ownership with privatization only, instead of examining the 
potential of regulating a private monopoly. The balance there is stated to depend on whether or 
not contracts are complete. If they are, meaning that they “define all aspects of performance and 
every possible eventuality,” then a difference should be minimal.13 Obviously, this is a high 
standard unlikely to be met in the majority of cases.  
Both of these competing theories of the firm help structure the debate on state versus 
private-owned industry, though neither ownership nor market structure dominate the theoretical 
discourse. Similarly, each one shows a disconnect between theory and the empirical data. That is 
not to say that they are inherently flawed, but rather that, like many purely economic theories, 
they simply cannot possibly integrate the multitude of variables that influence outcomes. Instead, 
they enumerate key explanatory concepts like agency costs and takeover markets that help orient 
the more qualitative, descriptive theories common in political economy literature.  
Historical Institutionalism and Theories of Policy Change 
 Because the ownership of a resource industry is necessarily the result of a state economic 
policy, understanding how states arrive at their policy outcomes yields powerful clues for 
analysis. Like the tension between ownership and market structure, policy change literature 
reflects a struggle for primacy between structure-driven and agency-driven approaches. 
Structuralism focuses on the constraining effect of institutions on behavior, while agent driven 
approaches focus on individual rationality. This duality is questioned somewhat by Hay and 
Wincott, however, who call for reconciliation between the two forces as a way to overturn a 
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popular emphasis on institutional inertia.14 Differing theories of institutionalism exist, varying 
from sociological institutionalism to rational choice analysis.   
Historical institutionalism is another theoretical means to explain policy change, focusing 
on policy as a result of the way strategic choices by policymakers are influenced by institutional 
environments and long-term conflicts between actors. The temporal aspect here is a crucial 
differentiation. Instead of a “break point from equilibria, change is an outcome of concrete 
historical processes,” according to Singh.15 Internal contradictions and tensions are inherent in 
this model and the way they interact over time creates layers of policy. Similarly, Silva argues 
that models of resource governance are better conceived as a bundle of industrial and social 
policies than one coherent policy.16 New policy can either replace existing rules (institutional 
displacement) or coexist with old rules (institutional layering). There are two other levels of 
policy change besides specific policy instruments, however: overarching goals and techniques 
used to obtain these goals. Change in policy orientation can take place on any or all of these 
levels. Determining the primary medium for change allows one to examine ideational aspects of 
institutional change as well as the more discrete material sources of change.17 As such, the 
adoption of an economic model cannot be viewed as a single, distinct event, but rather as one 
step in an ongoing process. This emphasizes the effects of historical trends and contextual details 
over any specific aspects of a given policy. As Singh aptly puts it, “institutional change is not a 
neat process nor are institutional designs coherent models.”18 Accordingly, models of resource 
governance are not monolithic either, but reflect the internal tensions and struggles inherent in 
policymaking processes.  
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 Hay, Colin and Daniel Wincott. "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism.”, 1998): 951.  
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  Nem Singh J.T. "Reconstituting the Neostructuralist State” (2010): 1413-1433. 
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 Silva, Eduardo. "The Import-Substitution Model: Chile in Comparative Perspective." 69. 
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Historical institutionalism is useful for this paper because it structures the analysis of the 
policy changes that shape resource industry. Understanding how and why current models of 
industry evolved into their current state is a crucial step towards assessing the implications of 
public and private firms because their viability is inevitably shaped by the political economy in 
which they operate. This may seem like tautological, yet it is worth explaining. Silva points to a 
mistaken conceptualization of political economic models as well-defined, consistent, and most 
importantly, monolithic. Models of resource governance, like development models, are not 
implemented in their final form: they are crafted gradually as a response to the historical 
context.19 Since identifying what factors influence the formation of these models is the central 
goal of this paper, the questions prompted through a historical institutionalist approach provide 
another layer of analysis.   
State Autonomy, Capacity, and the Challenges of Economic Regulation  
 Due to overlap between resource curse and development theories, political economy 
theory offers substantial contributions to the subject of natural resource industry. Existing 
literature identifies a number of factors that influence a state’s policymaking with regard to 
extractive industries. That said, the variety of lenses and approaches encompassed in a label like 
political economy literature warrants further even further differentiation.  
 At its most basic level the resource curse hypothesis shows high levels of resource 
abundance correlates with stunted economic development. The discourse came into prominence 
in the 1980s and has remained a staple political economy subject. Resource curse scholars 
generally tie the resource curse to the type of political state and its institutions. In her review of a 
diverse array of resource curse literature, Norman makes it abundantly clear that resource 
abundance is not inherently problematic, but rather a factor that can exaggerate bad 
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 Silva, Eduardo. "The Import-Substitution Model: Chile in Comparative Perspective." 67. 
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governance.20 Auty and Gelb are among those who conclude that a strong developmental state 
can help resource abundant countries maintain economic growth through decisive central 
planning.21 Economic rents, or “the surplus earned by factors of production over and above the 
minimum earnings necessary to induce their employment,” are a pillar of the resource curse 
hypothesis and resource governance in general. 22 Rents are important even when mining is 
privatized because governments create the fiscal regime and legislation that magnitude and 
sharing of rents.23 Government rents from extractive industries, generate political competition 
that can lead to factional, predatory states that seek to strategically distribute rents in order to 
stay in power, leading to incoherent and inefficient economic policy. Even a benevolent state that 
seeks to maximize long-run social welfare faces pressure to overextend itself.24 The influx of 
resource rents in an economy generally leads to relaxed market discipline that reduces 
investment efficiency over time. By contrast, resource poor states cannot afford to overextend 
themselves in support of inefficient endeavors or an expansive bureaucracy. Furthermore, the 
lack of natural resources necessitates investment in human and social capital. Contributions to 
the resource curse discourse are closely tied to discussions on models of natural resource 
industry because they share the same basic governance issues.  
Political autonomy is often identified as one of the key factors in policymaking regarding 
economic policy. Auty and Gelb’s given solution to the resource curse is a developmental state 
with sufficient autonomy to maintain a coherent economic policy over the long-term, an 
argument that applies more generally to natural resource governance as well.25 Government 
                                                          
20
 Norman, Catherine S. "Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity." (2009) 186. 
21
  Auty, R. M. and A. H. Gelb. "Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States." (2001) 2. 
22
 Tilton, J. E. Mineral Wealth and Economic Development Rff Press, 1992. 62 
23
 Ibid 65 
24
 Auty, R. M. and A. H. Gelb. "Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States." (2001) 7. 
25
 Ibid 10. 
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autonomy refers to the degree of insulation of policymakers from societal demands. Without 
some degree of autonomy, political competition among interest groups would lead to incoherent 
economic policy. Politically popular but inefficient policies like public employment and import 
protection are generally preferred in the short-term by social groups over education, 
infrastructure and other forward-looking policies.26 As Przeworski and Limongi put it, 
“democracy is always responsive to the pressures for immediate consumption.”27 Silva states that 
state policymakers rarely benefit from absolute autonomy from social forces and are forced to 
broker multiclass social coalitions in support of their policies to stay in power.28 The creation of 
a meritocratic bureaucracy can lead to higher autonomy because policymakers are not elected, 
but this approach brings concerns of inefficiencies and increased opportunities for corruption.  
Political institutions are not the only factors affecting the autonomy of economic 
policymaking; societal constraints also play a role. Haggard and Moon explain the limits of 
institutional theories of national level policymaking and the influence that social groups can 
possess. By relying on generalized, highly aggregate models of political regimes, institutional 
theories lack the descriptive depth of societal approaches.29 Beyers and Kerremans focus on 
competing social cleavages to examine how different interest groups mobilize to gain 
government influence. In their 2004 study of EU politics, they conclude that social cleavages 
between pro-environment groups and pro-growth groups prevent the development of an effective 
technocracy. Beyers and Kerremans identify an issue’s potential for mobilizing broad public 
support as the main factor in determining an interest groups ability to influence policy.30 Social 
                                                          
26
 Ibid 2. 
27
 Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." (1993): 51-69. 
28
 Silva, Eduardo. "The Import-Substitution Model: Chile in Comparative Perspective." 70. 
29
 Haggard, Stephan, and Chung-In Moon. "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study." 
World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations. 42 (1990): 210-237. 
30
 Beyers, Jan, and Bart Kerremans. "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests". Comparative Political Studies. 
37, No. 2 (2004): 1119-1150. 
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issues surrounding extractive industries are renowned for their ability to mobilize the formation 
of competing coalitions. Ballard and Banks see mining as an anthropological discourse that has 
begun to incorporate new actors from a variety of backgrounds since the 1980s minerals boom 
generated scholarly interest. What was once a conventional binary contest between states and 
corporations has broadened to include representatives of local communities, environmental 
advocates, and others. These coalitions are often unstable and centered on individual projects.31 
The balance of competing social group constrains a state’s policymaking autonomy.  
Autonomy is balanced by concerns for accountability, although they are not mutually 
exclusive. In an interesting overlap with economic theory, Vernon explores the different devices 
states use to balance concerns of autonomy and accountability. He concludes that states have 
almost always attempted to separate SOEs from ordinary government ministries rather than fully 
incorporate them into existing government structures, a direction usually leading to suboptimal 
results.32 Transparency is a significant aspect of accountability and is especially important in 
cases of decentralized resource governance. Transparency can also help mitigate the governance 
concerns of SOEs because firms are less likely to deviate from stated goals and policies when 
they are public. Accountability can stymie corruption and ensure that government’s most basic 
mandate is fulfilled: to serve the needs of its constituents.  
Government capacity is another key factor in natural resource governance, whether 
public or private in. Where autonomy affects the state’s ability to choose policy, capacity refers 
to the state’s ability to effectively implement chosen policy. Singh places capacity and autonomy 
together as the most important determinants of governance, arguing that “it is state capacity and 
                                                          
31
 Ballard, Chris and Glenn Banks. "Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining." Annual Review of Anthropology 
32, (2003): 288. 
32
 Vernon, Raymond. "Linking Managers with Ministers: Dilemmas of the State-Owned Enterprise." Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 4, no. 1 (1984): 39-55. 
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autonomy from societal forces, regardless of political ideology, which permit the state to take a 
steering role in economic management, specifically through a relatively coherent policy network 
for implementing state planning.”33 Economic management here can refer to state-led industry or 
regulatory processes for private enterprise. State capacity is an obvious necessity for managing 
and enforcing the royalty regimes affecting PEs in resource industry, as well as other regulatory 
regimes like environmental agencies.  
Privatization also emerged as a major political economy discourse in the 1980s when a 
slew of resource abundant developing nations began reevaluating the ISI models that 
predominated in post-colonial resource economies. Discussions of privatization trend towards 
institutional analysis, focusing on the presence of regulatory institutions as a determinant of 
success. Fishlow’s assessment of Latin American political economic transformation in the 1980s 
reacts against the proliferation of literature proclaiming privatization as a panacea for 
development issues.34  
Big push theory also merits mentioning here because of its implications for development 
through natural resource extraction. Big push reasoning is based upon the presence of low-
income equilibrium traps that prevent industrialization due to high fixed costs. Resource 
industries present a viable solution to this dilemma by providing the initial capital flows 
necessary to incentivize entrepreneurial activity in the early phases of industrialization.35 
Without this initial impetus, developing nations do not have the resources to build the necessary 
infrastructure. This is a counterpoint to resource curse models that emphasize diversifying 
resource abundant developing economies away from the export of a handful of primary 
commodities because it strongly doubts their ability to do so. Big push reasoning does not 
                                                          
33
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 Fishlow, Albert. "The Latin American State." (1990) 70. 
35
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explicitly favor a state-led or private-led approach as long as a significant portion of rents are 
kept in the producing country to spur this transformation.   
The location of the scholarly contributions discussed in the preceding pages is necessary 
to note before moving on to case studies. In development literature, topics like natural resource 
management and the role of the state in extractive industry were at their peak in the 1980s and 
early 1990s and have since been largely ignored. This can partially be explained by the political 
context, given the cold war’s penchant for transforming discourses to fit its own oppositional 
nature. State-led approaches were juxtaposed with free-market capitalism on ideological grounds 
as much as their development potential. It is also possible that natural resource management was 
still a new topic for the many formerly colonial nations seeking to enter the world economy in 
the quickest way possible. Cheap manufacturing by MNCs has arguably usurped the position of 
resource extraction as the predominant development concern in poor countries. Either way, there 
exists a notable lack of interest in the subject since the 1990s, which is problematic given the 
changing nature of the international economy. I refer specifically to the relatively recent 
emphasis on environmental and ethnic or regional issues. Environmentalism has reached a 
threshold worldwide so that MNCs are forced to tailor their activities to face a globalized norm 
or face retribution by consumer groups and government regulatory agencies. Likewise, 
discussions of minority ethnic rights and regional autonomy have risen steadily since the end of 
the cold war as nationalism gave way to the rise of regional and ethnic identities. Rarely can 
states now endeavor independently to extract resources for the benefit of the nation; rather they 
must balance the development demands of smaller communities and interest groups. This adds 





 This paper contributes to a fundamental discourse in international political economy by 
reconciling the established theoretical approaches mentioned previously with the analysis of two 
case studies predominantly based on in-depth interviews. I conducted on-site, taped interviews 
between June and August of 2011 on a research trip in Bolivia and Chile.36 Interviews were 
conducted in English and Spanish.37 Subjects came from a wide array of backgrounds in the 
lithium industry, ranging from bureaucrats in the Bolivian state-owned mining corporation 
(COMIBOL) to economists with doctoral degrees from US universities. Due to the wide range of 
backgrounds and perspectives being examined, interviews were semi-structured and did not 
maintain a consistent structure. However, fieldwork focused on examining a basic set of issues: 
how each nation’s political economy of lithium had developed, how the subject perceived the 
current state of their respective nation’s lithium industry, and the prospects for future change. I 
also took a guided tour of COMIBOL’s lithium pilot plant.   
 I chose to use primarily qualitative research methods for a mix of practical and strategic 
reasons. The opaque nature of the lithium industry worldwide is one important constraint. 
Although currently almost all lithium producers are publically-traded MNCs, market data 
remains limited and hard to find. Transactions are made directly between producers and 
consumers, not on a public commodities market like most minerals. Market estimates of supply 
and demand are therefore difficult to find. Chilean government tax records are one of the ways to 
get around this issue to examine sales and profits, but this is more difficult because lithium 
represents less than 25% of total sales for its producers. Potassium and other chemical products 
derived from brines have a much larger global market. The state-owned Bolivian enterprise is 
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significantly less transparent and publishes little that could be used in quantitative analysis. The 
relatively small size of the global lithium market is another factor contributing to the dearth of 
public data.  
 Strategic considerations also steered me towards qualitative methods. Examining the 
political economy of lithium in a region so laden with historical and cultural factors inevitably 
leads to complexities better suited to more flexible, descriptive methods. I felt that limiting my 
analysis to a number of factors manageable for econometric or other quantitative methods would 
have been irresponsible. Fieldwork sought to make up for the lack of existing academic research 
on global lithium industry.  
 This paper’s methodology presents serious limitations as well, however, as focusing on 
qualitative methods often means foregoing the general applicability of numerical analysis. The 
conclusions reached in this paper will be difficult to transfer to other specific cases due to the 
large number of factors discussed. Other studies will require similarly rigorous fieldwork to 
make use of these conclusions. Even so, the advantages of qualitative research methods remain 
decisive.  
Lithium Industries in Chile and Bolivia: Case Studies 
 The decision to examine the comparative development of Chile and Bolivia’s lithium 
industries as case studies is a product of current and future conditions. Although lithium is a 
relatively unknown industry at the moment, it has massive amounts of potential for growth given 
its applications in energy storage. Lithium-ion battery packs are currently the standard in 
portable electronics and appear to be the future of electric vehicles. The current market size is 
estimated to be US $450 million and 25% of lithium is used in the production of batteries. Glass 
and lubricants make up the other two largest market sections. The strategy of the Chilean MNC 
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Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile (SQM) for lithium is focused on electric cars. They 
estimate that as many as eighteen million cars could be using lithium-ion batteries by 2030.38 
Other analysts estimate that sales of lithium car batteries could grow by 1000% in the next two 
decades.39 Car batteries are not the only avenue for growth, as a vast array of electronics utilize 
lithium ion batteries. Bolivian economist Juan Carlos Zuleta believes that lithium could be the 
centerpiece of a “clean-tech paradigm” focused on environmental concerns and independence 
from fossil fuels.40  
This is not the first time experts have predicted a huge rise in lithium’s importance, 
however, and the last time was severely overestimated. During the height of the hype on nuclear 
energy in the 1970s, lithium was seen as a possible key component in fusion power. This led to 
much of the geological surveys that first established lithium reserve levels in South America and 
other political regulations that will be discussed later. Fusion power has not yet transitioned into 
a viable technology some forty years later and it should give some pause to observers. Electric 
powered cars also went through a boom in excitement during that time period and never 
materialized on the mass market. Tech analysts freely admit that current lithium ion technology 
is not yet ready to make the jump into an everyday consumer technology and that it requires 
further investment towards lower production costs to reach the optimistic forecasts.41 This 
growth potential raises the development stakes for states with deposits of the mineral. Like many 
extractive resources with high value, lithium could spur meaningful economic development, or 
decline a la the resource curse.  
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The recent history of the region’s production of lithium also lends it to analysis. Unlike 
more traditional natural resource industries like copper or tin, the contemporary nature of 
lithium’s latest rise to importance means that its political economy is generally less established. 
Chile has been producing industrial quantities of lithium for barely three decades and Bolivia has 
yet to bring any quantity to market. Thus, I believe that their political economy is more “pure” 
and contains less confounding variables than an industry like copper that has dominated the 
region’s economies for centuries. This is not discounting the role of historical factors in the 
creation of the respective nations’ development strategies, but rather that there exists less of the 
embedded, institutional obstacles to change that are seen in industries with long histories. These 
characteristics made lithium a compelling industry for case studies in natural resource 
economics. 
 I chose Bolivia and Chile as comparative case studies because although they possess 
relatively similar resources geologically, their strategies of developing lithium industries could 
not be more different. Both nations produce lithium from brines under salt lakes in the Atacama 
Desert of central South America and between them they account for 66% of world lithium 
resources , according to the most recent estimates by the US Geological Survey (USGS).42 This 
creates a control variable of sorts that allows for more focused analysis on the effects of different 
forms of government involvement. Because their geographic qualities are similar, varying 
outcomes of lithium industry must then be a result of political and economic factors.  
The fact that Chile and Bolivia share some aspects of their cultural heritage and colonial 
history is similarly important for analysis. Both nations were colonies under the Spanish empire 
until the early 19th century and therefore originated with similar institutions. Though the legacy 
of Spanish influence is perhaps less visible in Bolivia, the lithium-producing regions of both 
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nations are inhabited by largely the same ethnic groups. The Aymara are an indigenous people 
that have lived in the high Andean plateaus of South America since well before the Spanish 
arrival. They maintain an ethnic majority in both the Potosí department of Bolivia and the 
Chilean region of Antofagasta, which contain the nation’s lithium resources. Both Chile and 
Bolivia are ethnically heterogeneous nations by region, which makes the locally concentrated 
nature of the lithium industry more problematic. Questions over how to distribute control over 
resources and the rents associated with that control are complicated when the populations around 
production sites are primarily of one ethnic group, in this case the Aymara.  
Each nation’s lithium reserves are similar but not equal. Simply put, extracting lithium is 
significantly easier in Chile’s Salar de Atacama than in Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni, despite the size 
of overall reserves. Jaime Claros, a Bolivian chemical engineer at the Autonomous University of 
Tomás Frías in Potosí, Bolivia, has been studying the Salar de Uyuni for over 20 years and 
points to several key differences between the two sites: evaporation rates, relative concentrations 
of lithium to other minerals in the brines, and seasonal precipitation levels.43 The standard 
production process for lithium carbonate, which is the most common commercial form, requires 
months of evaporation to reach acceptable concentrations. Lower evaporation rates in Bolivia 
mean that this phase of the project takes three to five months longer than in Chile. Similarly, 
southern Bolivia suffers from a nearly five month rainy season, which can flood the evaporation 
pools and dilute the chemical solution. When I was in Uyuni, the entire Salar was flooded under 
50 cm of rainwater. This complicated transportation around the facility and ongoing construction 
efforts. To contrast, Chile’s Salar de Atacama is one of the driest places on earth. The ratio of 
lithium to magnesium and other minerals is measurably different between the two sites as well. 
In Chile the ratio of lithium to magnesium is between 1:6 and 1:8, in Bolivia it is between 1:18 
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and 1:24.44 This makes the chemical extraction process less efficient and drives costs up. All of 
these factors help make the Chilean industry more efficient and competitive.  
The Current State of the Lithium Industry  
Despite its potential for growth, lithium currently represents only a tiny fraction of 
Chile’s GDP. Chile is currently the world’s largest lithium producer, accounting for some 40-
60% of world supply45, yet less than 1% of the nation’s GDP.46  Total production has varied 
widely in the past decade due to unstable demand around the 2008 crisis but rose in 2010 and 
that trend is expected to continue due to strong demand in Asia. SQM has an annual capacity of 
40,000 metric tons and the German-owned MNC Chemetall SCL trails at 28,000 metric tons.47   
Chilean production is entirely privatized, exclusive to SQM and SCL, the two MNCs 
who enjoy special mandates from the central government thanks to a grandfather clause in 
regulation. Chile followed a worldwide movement in the 1970s and designated its lithium 
reserves to be strategic resources due to their use in processing nuclear fuel and potential for 
nuclear fusion, which delegated stricter regulation to the state. The 1979 Decree Law Number 
2886 limited the mining, processing, and trading of lithium compounds to the Chilean State or to 
operating companies via special arrangement48. 
The two MNCs that operate currently in Chile bought out concessions to mine lithium 
from the state development agency CORFO. CORFO commissioned two independent projects in 
the 1980s to explore the economic potential of the Atacama salt flats, the Lithium Project and the 
Potassium Salts and Boric Acid Project.49 The contracts for both projects initiated as mixed 
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enterprises between CORFO and private corporations. CORFO sold the two concessions 
gradually during the nation’s privatization phase in the mid-1980s and the legislature has not yet 
amended lithium’s status to allow further concessions to be allotted.  
According to Jose Ascencio, a professor of mining at the University of Santiago, Chile, 
the prospect of amending the legislation relating to lithium production is dim, despite its 
antiquated restrictions.50 Nuclear applications of lithium reflect scientific knowledge from the 
1970s and Chile still does not use nuclear power, although it has reinitiated talks with France and 
US to move in that direction. The world is also no closer to viable fusion energy, which was one 
of the driving forces behind the initial restrictions. Another obstacle in the way of liberalizing the 
lithium market in Chile is the lack of data on reserves.51 The government has based its appraisals 
on USGS surveys from the 1970s, information that must be updated before further concessioning 
can take place.  
The royalty regime affecting production is similarly dated and reflects the incoherent 
nature of the concessions. SQM pays a combination of a fixed $150,000 annual rent and a 6.8% 
of its lithium sales to the Chilean government. Since SCL’s contract was more focused on 
general brine minerals, it pays 10% of magnesium sales and 3% of potassium chloride sales in 
royalties. Both concessions limit production, although in different forms. The concession owned 
by SCL expires in 2030 and has a maximum production limit of 180,000 tons of lithium metal, 
which analysts predict will be fulfilled by 2023. SQM ‘s concession has not expiration year but 
limits consumption to 200,000 tons of lithium metal. 52 As a whole, Chilean state income from 
lithium taxes is tiny in scale. 
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 In contrast, Bolivia’s state-led approach has yet to bring any quantity of lithium to the 
market. The project began in 2007 under the very public direction of President Morales. Morales 
laid out a three phase plan for development in 2008 known as the “National Strategy for the 
Bolivian Evaporate Resources Industrialization.” The plan calls for the construction of a pilot 
plant with limited production capability in phase one, scaled up production of lithium and other 
evaporate resources in phase two, and the development of value-added industries like batteries 
and electric cars for phase three.53 Of the three phases, only the final one is open to foreign 
investment. Evert Villena, the Director of External Relations and Communications in 
COMIBOL’s evaporate division, maintains that Bolivia has the capability to develop the high-
tech industry independently and insists that the effort faces no major technological barriers.54 
The extraction of lithium from the salt flats will be 100% state-owned and based on Bolivian 
scientific efforts, which many argue are not up to international standards.55 Total investment for 
the first two phases was initially targeted at over US $500 million, to be covered entirely by the 
Bolivian central bank and treasury. The production of lithium carbonate is expected to 
commence in the early months of 2012, more than a year behind schedule.56 
Ensuring Property Rights and Historical Juridical Security 
Historical factors, like the consistent maintenance and enforcement of economic policy 
over time, are perhaps the most important factors affecting the formation of Bolivia and Chile’s 
current lithium policy. Chile has maintained the same neoliberal economic model established in 
the early 1970s with few changes, whereas Bolivia shifted from import-substitution 
                                                          
53
 COMIBOL. "National Strategy for the Bolivian Evaporate Resources Industrialization." Accessed November 9, 
2011. 
54
 Villena, Evert. 2011. Interview by Author. La Paz, Bolivia. June  16 
55
 Every interview subject other than Villena agreed that Bolivian effort was destined for failure without outside 
technological assistance. 
56
 COMIBOL. “National Strategy” 
Knape 22 
 
industrialization (ISI) to liberalism and now back to a more statist model. It is important to note, 
however, that neither Bolivia nor Chile are perfect examples of their respective economic 
ideologies. CODELCO, Chile’s state owned copper corporation, still accounts for some 30% of 
the nation’s copper production and hundreds of millions of dollars in yearly revenue for the 
state.57 Bolivia similarly licenses out production of petroleum products, tin, and other minerals to 
MNCs. These seemingly outlying policies underscore the historical institutionalist view of 
development models as bundles of economic and industrial policy rather than totally coherent, 
ideological creations. This is an important distinction because both Bolivia and Chile 
consciously enacted policy specific to the evaporate resources. As historical institutionalism 
posits, policymakers did not simply apply industrial policy wholesale to the entire economy. 
Thus, it warrants analysis of why Chile chose to regulate an entirely private industry when 
Bolivia has stuck to its state owned plans. 
Chile adopted its current economic model during the military government of Augustus 
Pinochet, who brought in US-trained economists famously known as the “Chicago Boys” to 
implement a market-oriented economic model. By the early 1980s the Chilean government had 
sold off the majority of the firms nationalized under the previous government of socialist 
Salvadore Allende and was rapidly pursuing bilateral FTA’s and other liberalizing measures. 
When the Pinochet government was voted out in 1988, the new left-leaning coalition government 
opted to continue the neoliberal model. Chilean economic policy has largely stayed the same 
since 1973. This fits with the conclusions that Przeworski and Limongi noted earlier on 
“developmentalist” dictatorships.58 
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Bolivia pursued fully three separate economic models in the same time frame, beginning 
with fully three decades of ISI following the 1952 revolution. 59 Bolivia ran into the same debt 
problems as its neighbors in the early 1980s, however, and the 1985 elections ushered in the 
liberal New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP shared much in common with Chile’s neoliberal 
model, including its origins. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, mentioned earlier for his 
contributions to big push theory, was instrumental in developing the model. Sachs worked 
closely with the new government in order to shift towards an outward-oriented economy with 
liberalized domestic markets and a minimal state.60 This phase of Bolivia economic history 
lasted until the 2005 election of Morales and his Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party. By 
2004, only 11 percent of Bolivians believed in the merits of a liberal market-driven economy.61 
Morales worked quickly to nationalize the natural gas industry and public utilities which were 
privatized under the NEP. Morales refers to the current economic model as “communitarian 
socialism” and eschews neoliberalism as a form of imperialism.  
  Regardless of the effects of any one model, the development benefits of ensuring private 
property rights through consistent economic policy cannot be overemphasized. Natural resource 
industries are massively capital intensive, requiring huge initial investment that sometimes is not 
recouped for decades. If the industrialization is driven by the private sector like in Chile, 
nationalization, or simply the threat of it, leaves a lasting impression. Infrastructure, technology, 
capacitation of labor all take time and investment to develop. In developing nations that lack 
state financing for large infrastructure projects, MNCs bear a greater share of these costs in order 
to operate. Three decades of consistent economic policy have made Chile one of the best 
business environments in Latin America. Investors know what to expect and trust that their 
                                                          
59
 Jenkins, Rhys. "Trade Liberalisation in Latin America: (1997): 311-312. 
60
 Ibid  
61
 Ton Salman. "Bolivia and the Paradoxes of Democratic Consolidation." (2007): 121. 
Knape 24 
 
property rights and contracts will be protected. The private sector is wary of Bolivia because of 
its tumultuous past. Doing Business, a project of the World Bank, encapsulated these differences 
in its 2010 rankings. Out of 183 countries included, Chile was the 39th most business friendly, 
while Bolivia was 153rd.62 Any discussion of changing royalty regimes has been staunched by 
policymakers worried about scaring off foreign investors. When then-President Ricardo Lagos 
tried to introduce a royalty charge based on sales in 2004, politicians balked at the thought. José 
Piñera, a co-author of Chile’s defining 1980 Mining Law, modestly states that his legislation was 
the “key to riches” because it “sent a message to domestic and foreign investors from that 
moment that private property was fully guaranteed in Chile.”63 
 While this argument applies more directly to private industry, the nature of the world 
economy means that even a state-owned approach must interact with private sector actors. In 
Bolivia, COMIBOL is in the process of finding investors to help develop its lithium industry and 
is running up against these issues. According to Rolando Jordan, a Bolivian mining economist, 
the Bolivian government is in a very weak negotiating position with MNCs because it must start 
from scratch each time it alters policy.64 For private sector actors already spooked by Morales’ 
rhetoric on MNCs, negotiating partnerships becomes a very risky affair. Risk lowers businesses 
rate of return and causes them to negotiate more strictly at the state’s expense.  
 Levels of industrial infrastructure and development have also played roles in the 
formation of the lithium industry in Chile and Bolivia. Andrés Yaksic, SQM’s Marketing Manager 
for lithium products, said it was impossible to ignore the benefits of Chile’s mineral history. Thanks to 
Chile’s large-scale copper mining throughout the 20th century, lithium producers had all of the 
necessary pieces in place and had drastically reduced start-up costs. Electricity, water, transport 
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infrastructure were established in northern Chile’s Antofagasta region, which also possesses the 
nation’s lithium resources. 65 Bolivia also has a long mining history, but not of the modern 
industrial sort seen in Chile. CODELCO alone exports some 1.8 million tons of copper yearly.66 
For a smaller industry like lithium, Chilean producers benefit from more than adequate 
infrastructure. To contrast, Uyuni, the closest town to the Bolivian pilot plant and provincial 
headquarters for COMIBOL, has only benefitted from consistent electricity in the past decade. 
Yaksic, Zuleta, and Villena all acknowledged existing infrastructure as one of the most important 
differences in cost between the two nations.67 
 The legacy of colonialism is the other major historical factor affecting Bolivian and 
Chilean economic policymaking. Until their independence movements in the early 19th century, 
the two countries experienced essentially the same colonial experience. As their colonial power, 
Spain used natural resources extracted from Bolivia and Chile to finance its imperial ambitions.68 
The most famous example of this exploitation is Bolivia’s Cerro Rico, an incredible silver 
deposit located less than 100 miles from the Uyuni salt flat. Both Bolivia and Chile have 
remained primary commodity exporting economies long after formal independence. Bolivian 
economist Milton Lerida believes that Bolivia is worse off in today’s capitalist economic 
structure than during its colonial period because the scale of extractive mining is so much 
larger.69  Indeed, one could argue that the difference in the two nations’ reaction to prior 
exploitation is more due to current economic status and political posturing by the Morales 
government than differences during colonial times. It is hard to argue that Bolivia had a 
substantially worse colonial experience, yet the narrative remains much more prominent in 
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Bolivian policymaking. Ethnicity has also played a part in the development of the discourse. The 
narrative of white European exploitation of indigenous populations, whether justified or not, is 
influential. Dennis points to the Bolivian government’s use of buzzwords like dignity and 
sovereignty in describing the project as a means to drum up nationalist sentiment.70 Interviews 
conducted with Bolivian actors revealed that a liberal, privatized lithium industry is not even 
considered a possibility due to past exploitation by colonial powers.  
The role of Washington Consensus actors in Bolivia’s failed privatization movements 
during the 1980 and 1990s also contributed to the public’s borderline xenophobic perception of 
foreign capital. The influence of international institutions grew during the tumultuous two 
decades prior, which led Burke and Malloy to coin the term national corporatism. Although 
national corporatism’s roots were populist and therefore rhetorically nationalistic, the era’s 
political elites consolidated power with support from the only stable source: western capitalist 
powers.71 According to Hollender and Shultz, more than 250 state employees were 
simultaneously on the payroll of the institutions like the World Bank and USAID during the mid-
1980s.72 This influence spurred on structural reforms from the IMF and the World Bank, which  
exacerbated already poor living conditions and were seen as another form of North American 
imperialism.73 Drastic drops in government revenues due to the privatization of petroleum, 
natural gas, and water extraction were accompanied by lower social spending, increased foreign 
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borrowing, and raised taxes. The IMF’s push for higher taxes in 2003 led to violent protests that 
left 34 people dead.74  
Duopolistic Competition in the Lithium Market 
 One of the underlying assumptions of economic theory regarding the efficiency of private 
firms and free markets is the existence of competitive markets. The lithium industry has a 
number of defining characteristics that make it markedly uncompetitive in this sense. The global 
lithium market is a duopoly thanks to SCL and SQM’s dominant market share.75 The two firms 
accounted for 70% of lithium produced from brines in 2010, or some 40,000 tons of lithium 
carbonate.76 Furthermore, production in Chile, Argentina, and Australia account for 82% of total 
lithium carbonate on the market. 77  
 Duopolistic production has a number of consequences for market access and firm 
behavior because SCL and SQM have such considerable market power. Ruttinger and Feil point 
to three possible negative consequences of the current lithium market structure: ruinous 
competition, collusion, and supply disruptions due to geographically concentrated production in 
a geologically unstable area.78 SQM demonstrated its market power in 2009 by lowering its 
lithium prices by 20%, widely viewed as a move targeted towards emerging producers under the 
auspices of controlling oversupply.79  The firm identified 14 projects worldwide currently in 
development phase.80 Chilean producers are thought to have the lowest costs of any and are 
producing at just over half of their capacity, which gives them further market power to adapt to a 
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changing market.81 The ability of Chilean firms alone to handle the predicted demand spikes due 
to electric vehicles depends on who you talk to. Yaksic is confident that SQM and SCL will be 
able to meet global demand at least through 2020 before adding capacity.82 Zuleta believes water 
shortages in the region will limit their ability to increase production on the level necessary.83  
 For the Bolivian project which is already at least a year behind schedule, the duopoly of 
Chilean producers presents a major obstacle that is exacerbated by the closed nature of lithium 
markets. Because lithium is not a publically traded commodity like many mineral resources, 
existing client-producer relationships are even more important. As Asencio puts it, “this is not a 
free market; this is more like a client-producer relationship. It is more direct. The price is not tied 
to other conditions; a producer can drive prices and control them more.“84 In a perfectly 
competitive commodity market it would not matter if Bolivia’s production was viewed as 
unreliable due to political concerns about public ownership. Unfortunately for Bolivian 
prospects, continuing with the established Chilean firms makes more sense in a duopolistic 
producer-client structured market. 
Political Trends and Leadership Problems 
 The presence of national populist movements in Bolivia presents further difficulties for 
developing a public industry. This conclusion is strongly supported empirically by interviews as 
well as existing scholarly analysis. MAS came to power in 2005 with the backing of rural coca 
farmers, the urban poor, and indigenous ethnic communities and by many accounts has struggled 
to maintain autonomy from social groups in economic policymaking. Bolivia’s ever-present 
nepotism has grown to a point that Morales acknowledged in 2009 that corruption and 
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bureaucratic ineffectiveness were the most serious challenges facing his second term as 
president. Bolivia was 120th out of 180 countries for public-sector corruption in Transparency 
International’s 2010 rankings.85  Part of this is due to a ballooning public sector funded by 
natural gas revenues, but the diverse makeup of the ruling coalition also lends itself to nepotism. 
The state-owned natural gas and oil corporation (YPFB) is itself the site of frequent accusations 
of corruption.86  The nature of multiparty political competition also feeds patronage, as public 
employment is used to ensure cooperation. As such, the majority of management personnel in 
executive ministries end up being political appointees instead of meritocratic hires.87 As theory 
predicts, individual interests have led to suboptimal policymaking. 
 Leadership and management concerns, usually due to nepotism, were voiced in all of my 
Bolivian interviews. The massive logistical and technological expertise inherent in a project of 
this magnitude necessitates utilizing the best talent available. The management inefficiencies 
presented in theories of the firm appear to be fully present in Bolivia. Zuleta pointed specifically 
to lack of a clear organizational structure and confusion over responsibility.88 Hollender and 
Shultz explain how decision-making regarding lithium must travel between a myriad assortment 
of government ministries and committees, each vying for increased power and influence.89 
Reynaldo Cuadros, a member of the Bolivian Socialist Party in the provincial legislature and 
former Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), identified a lack of formal 
education as a key cause of governance problems.90 For example, President Morales never 
graduated from secondary school.  
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 The exclusion and alienation of leading scientific figures is another symptom of the 
management deficiencies facing the Bolivian lithium industry. Bolivian petrochemical engineer 
Saul Escalera knows firsthand how complicated Bolivia’s public sector work can be. In 2006 
Escalera was appointed by Morales to be YPFB’s Director of Industrialization, specifically 
charged with developing domestic industries related to petrochemical derivatives. Escalera, who 
holds two patents for petrochemical refinement processes, resigned from his post in 2009 and 
published a scathing reprisal of the Morales government’s management of the state-owned 
corporation. Escalera bemoans the politically-motivated leadership purges that led to six 
company presidents in three years, the inability of management to think outside the box and take 
risks, and the priority of political concerns over the company’s administration and market 
position. His central concern, however, is the lack of technical expertise on the part of political 
appointees.91 Escalera recounted how his best engineering students that went to work for the 
state ended up doing manual labor instead of advanced science because of their lack of political 
connections. He remains an outspoken proponent of state ownership despite the disappointing 
behavior of the current government: a common position among Bolivian academics.92 Hollander 
and Shultz ran into similar stories in their research, commenting that “Bolivian experts with 
decades of experience in evaporitic resources complain that they have been intentionally 
excluded from the project due to political differences.”93 COMIBOL representatives point to a 
scientific advisory committee that is supposed to offer technical consulting to the project as 
evidence that participation is encouraged, but as the committee offers no financial compensation 
it is not a terribly realistic option for academics with advanced degrees. Considering that there 
already exists a fierce debate over whether or not any Bolivians have sufficient knowledge to 
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successfully industrialize lithium production independently, the inefficient use of expertise due 
to political concerns is a significant failure. Again, these failures are not inherent in Bolivia’s 
state-owned approach, but due to the nepotistic pressures facing a populist government.  
 By comparison, the private Chilean firms are relatively independent from political 
pressures. They face the same management concerns of any MNC, but have complete autonomy 
in management affairs. It is ironic, however, that SQM’s entry into lithium market was a clear 
case of nepotism and political influence. The current Chairman of the board of directors is Julio 
Ponce, son-in-law of Pinochet. Ponce headed the privatization process of CORFO in the early 
1980s when it owned the lithium concessions before buying SQM from the government in 1988 
for what a government investigation later said was less than a third of its market price.94 Ponce 
has headed the majority stakeholding group in SQM since that time.  
The key difference between this example of corruption and what is currently happening 
in Bolivia is the established nature of Chilean technocracy at the time. Chilean technocrats like 
Ponce were college educated and had experience running private enterprise before entering the 
public sector following the military coup in 1973. As was true for the Pinochet regime in general, 
the technocrats economic successes came at the expense of income equality as the state reduced 
social expenditures during privatization. Copper is once again a confounding variable, however, 
and a poignant counter-narrative to Pinochet’s neoliberal ideology.95 The Pinochet regime 
continued the nationalization process initiated under deposed socialist president Salvadore 
Allende and would receive anywhere from 10-25% of yearly government revenue from copper 
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sales, depending on commodity prices.96 In Bolivia currently, Morales’ MAS party is replacing 
the existing bureaucracy with his primary support base: rural indigenous farmers.97 While 
Morales’ other efforts to combat income inequality and embedded racism against indigenous 
Bolivians have been widely lauded, the appointment of inexperienced, uneducated party 
members to bureaucratic positions has led to predictable management failures.  
Decentralization and Regional Involvement 
 Distribution of policymaking responsibility between central and regional political 
institutions plays a large role in determining the development implications of the lithium 
industry. Like most extractive industries, lithium is geographically concentrated in both nations. 
In both cases, lithium production is centered in some of the most developmentally challenged 
regions.  Chile has always been a unitary state, while Bolivia has become increasingly 
decentralized politically under the MAS government. All mining legislation and regulation in 
Chile must pass through the national congress in the capital, regardless of its impact on region 
where the activity actually takes place. It follows that decentralized resource governance has a 
better chance of capturing economic benefits for the regions affected by the environmental costs 
of economic activity. Andersson et al explain that decentralized resource policies come 
predominantly in two forms, one seeking to devolve property rights to local communities, the 
other seeking to allocate formal powers to subunits of the government. According to Andersson 
et al, the form of decentralization changes incentives for local actors and that determines how 
successful efforts are. 98  
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 The Potosí province of Bolivia has the nation’s highest poverty rate and about 46 percent 
of the local population works in agriculture and livestock.99 Although the Chilean region of 
Antofagasta has the infrastructure in place for the mineral mining industries, it also lacks 
employment and trained labor. The direct impact of the lithium industry on other economic 
activity is unfortunately minimal, as there are few linkages to other economic activity. This is 
due to the rather unique nature of evaporative mining, which needs relatively small amounts of 
labor and minimal skilled labor. This leads to a crucial question: how to best distribute the rents 
associated with the lithium industry. While these two regions would clearly benefit from further 
development, there are doubts about the ability of local government’s ability efficiently use 
resources.100 Lerida, who lives in Uyuni, believes the provincial government of Daniel Campos 
technically owns the rights to the lithium resources and should use rents to start a university 
cluster that could further the development potential of the resource for local residents, not the 
government in the capital. Lerida’s position is closely tied to his own ancestry in the region; he 
calls the salt flat by its Aymaran name Tunupa instead of Uyuni and scorns what he sees as short 
term thinking by the central government. Such an important opportunity needs to be viewed in 
terms of centuries or millennia, not decades, according to Lerida.101  
 Transparency and accountability are necessary components of decentralized resource 
policy as responsibility is shuffled around. Andersson et al assert that these approaches need 
institutions that tie local politicians closely to their constituents.102 Zuleta emphasizes the role of 
what he calls “social control” of the government’s effort, essentially accountability to make sure 
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the project is meeting its targets and following through on policy.103 In this instance, 
accountability and transparency are less about autonomy and more about minimizing the lack of 
incentives caused by separated ownership and control. Hollender and Shultz expands the role of 
transparency and ties it to the success of the entire Bolivian effort. They call for tripartite 
transparency of formal oversight by political institutions, distribution of information by the 
media, and an informed citizenry.104  
Localization of Environmental and Social Impacts 
The limited geographic scope of lithium mining means that the social and environmental 
implications are concentrated in specific populations. The environmental effects of lithium 
mining have not been rigorously discussed, yet the Chilean industry seems to indicate serious 
externalities. Water consumption will be the most pressing concern in the short term, especially 
in the Chilean Atacama desert. According to Zuleta, producing two liters of lithium brine to 
evaporate requires 98 liters of fresh water.105 Refining processes drain the limited water supply 
further and have potential for contaminating aquifers. Lerida and Claros allege that the Chilean 
industry is drilling diagonally under the border and illegally siphoning water from Bolivia to 
meet its need, an allegation that has not been discussed in the press.106 Dennis indicates that 
draught in the region has already caused some local farmers to abandon their efforts.107 Concerns 
over water scarcity are amplified because the water reserves in the region are classified as non-
renewable due to the low rainfall.108 Hollender and Shultz cite more dire reports that community 
wells have dried up in recent years, although the nearby San Cristobal silver and zinc mine also 
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plays a large role in local water consumption. Local backlash against the project, which is owned 
and operated by a Japanese MNC, led to violent protests  in April of 2010. Furthermore, 
Hollender and Shutlz point to the Chilean and Argentinian lithium industries to demonstrate the 
possibility for toxic contamination.109   
 The environmental impacts of the lithium industry have resounding social effects as well 
given the dependency of local Bolivian populations on agriculture and tourism.110 Tourism 
provides a living for 23% of the local population and visits to Uyuni are rising.111 This 
adolescent industry depends on the natural beauty of the salt flats and may be decimated by large 
scale industrial activity. Chilean production has led to massive piles of mineral tailings and 
hundreds of square kilometers of artificial ponds and piping. Lerida recognizes the importance of 
maintaining a balance between industry and tourism in order to the help the region avoid 
becoming over dependent on any one industry.112 Seasonal tourism industries are certainly not 
the most stable forms of employment, but the loss of tourism would be devastating to the 
surrounding communities.  
Conclusion 
 Examining Bolivian and Chilean lithium industries as case studies, the optimal mix of 
public and private firms in natural resource economies is determined more by historical and 
political factors than economic theory would suggest. The defining factor in the development of 
each industry has been historical political trends, while political transparency appears to be the 
most key to advancing development goals. The lithium industry presents a unique opportunity 
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for Bolivia to independently exploit a natural resource from the beginning, whereas lithium 
remains relatively insignificant to Chilean development in comparison to copper. Moving 
forward, the development of a state-owned lithium industry in Bolivia faces a number of difficult 
obstacles, particularly maintaining a necessary degree of autonomy from political influence.  
The case studies showed that political economic theory and historical institutionalism 
provide the most nuanced analytical tools, whereas different versions of firm theory prove more 
useful as theoretical structures than empirical tools. Application of the arguments presented here 
to other cases is more difficult because of the quantitative approach adopted, however. Perhaps 
the most useful lesson is that issues of general economic efficiency are not the defining factors 
affecting a state’s development of natural resource policy and that they more often are 
misrepresented with ideological justifications. The role of the state cannot be reduced to the all 
or nothing ideologies that predominated during the Cold War.  
Rising income inequality throughout Latin America and the rest of the world lend a new 
sense of urgency to the debate. Efficient state ownership of extractive industries would be a 
powerful tool in helping to level the playing proverbial playing field and reallocate wealth, if it 
can be done successfully that is. Likewise, the impact of environmental degradation is growing 
as global consumption continues to rise and resource stocks begin to dwindle. Are states 
inherently more environmentally conscious producers or are they better suited to regulating the 
private sector? Given the right conditions, state ownership of natural resource industries offers 
potential remedies for these important global issues as well as basic welfare-enhancing 
development goals. 
There exists significant potential for further study of public and private firms in 
extractive industries because of the aforementioned lack of scholarly focus since the 1980s and 
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the renewed willingness of state’s to consider state-led development. Draibe and Riesco discuss 
the advent of a new development strategy emerging in Latin America, repositioning the state 
once more as a leading strategic and regulatory actor alongside modern civil society.113 The 
prevalence of state-led natural resource extraction in China presents another interesting case 
study. Indeed, some of the interviewees for this paper mentioned China as evidence of a new 
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